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REcENT CAsEs
sought to discourage oppressive police practices... .19 But there have
been other interpretations of Escobedo and for the final answer we
will have to await the Court's decision.
Charles A. Taylor
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TRIAL ON Two OFFENSES ARISING FROM THE
SAm Acr-No DOUBLE JEOPABIY INvoLvD.-Appellant was indicted
by the grand jury on charges of embezzlement. Prior to his trial for
embezzlement, the grand jury returned thirty-two indictments against
appellant for submitting false claims to the Pike County Board of
Education, a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Both the false claim and the embezzlement indictment covered the
same moneys. The commonwealth attorney, feeling that appellant
should be tried on a false claim indictment, filed a motion to dismiss
the embezzlement charge. This motion was overruled, and trial
proceeded on the embezzlement charge. The prosecution refused to
introduce evidence, and the jury acquitted appellant. Shortly there-
after, appellant was tried on one of the false claim indictments and
convicted.
On appeal, appellant contended, inter alia, that he had been put
in double jeopardy by his conviction for submitting a false claim,
maintaining his acquittal under the embezzlement indictment was a
bar to the false claim action.
Held: Affirmed. The court found that embezzlement and falsifying
a claim against a political subdivision are truly separate offenses, and
also found that double jeopardy meant "a person may not be tried or
prosecuted the second time for the same offense."1 Runyon v. Com-
monwealth, 393 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1965).
The doctrine of double jeopardy is so ancient that it is impossible
to trace its origin,2 and its concept is firmly embedded in the common
law and has been incorporated in most constitutions.3 The Kentucky
Constitution, echoing the prohibition of the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution, states in section 13, "No person shall, for
the same offense be twice put in jeopardy of his life or limb.... ."
In order for the double jeopardy prohibition to be invoked suc-
cessfully, the accused must be tried tvice for the same offense. It must
19In re Lopez, 42 Cal. 188, 398 P.2d. 380 (1965).
1 Moss v. Jones, 352 S.W.2d 557, 558 (Ky. 1961).
2 Mullins v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 529, 80 S.W.2d 606 (1935).
3 Burch v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 519, 42 S.W.2d 714 (1931).
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be remembered, however, that within one act there may be more than
one offense with trial permitted for each offense. The holding in this
case illustrates this concept of an act having more than one offense.
The crux of the matter revolves around the term "same offense."
In 1796, an English court narrowed the definition of "offense," equating
it with the legal theory on which the defendant is tried.4 Consequently,
applying this definition, a second trial based on the same factual
situation alleged in the first indictment, but proceeding under a
different legal theory, is not barred by the rule proscribing a second
trial for the same offense.
The underlying theory is still used in defining "offense." This is
evidenced by the test used by the court in deciding Runyon:
The test to determine whether the acts committed at the same time and
place constitute one or more offenses is, if the proof of what is set out
in the second indictment would sustain it, then the two indictments
are for the same offense. If what is set out in the second indictment
when proved upon trial of the first indictment will not sustain it, then
they are distinct offenses, and the conviction or acquittal of either is not
a bar to the other.6
In Basley v. CommonwealthO it was held that where the defendant
had robbed a safe after breaking into a house, there were two
separate offenses: 1) robbery of the safe, and 2) burglary. Conviction
for the robbery did not preclude prosecution for burglary. The act
committed by the defendant was one continuous incident. It was only
one "incident," but arising out of this one incident were two separate
offenses, for which all the elements of each offense were present.
Therefore, no double jeopardy was involved.
This same reasoning was used in Runyon, thereby leading to the
court's determination that no double jeopardy existed.
There are some situations where a retrial for the same offenses does
not constitute double jeopardy. When the accused seeks review of
his conviction, double jeopardy cannot be said to exist since the
accused himself requested the second trial. The accused is not being
subjected to undue harassment by the state. Reasoning that the
accused can appeal if there was error prejudicial to his defense, the
Court in Palko v. Connecticut permitted a state, pursuant to its
statutes, to be accorded the same privilege when error prejudicial to
the state was committed. The Court viewed this retrial not as an
attempt to wear the accused out by a multitude of trials, but rather an
4 The King v. Vandercomb & Abbot, 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (Ex.
1796).
5 Easley v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Ky. 1958).6 320 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1958).
7302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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attempt to present a case against the defendant in trial free of
substantial legal error.
The United States Supreme Court has held that for a state to try
a defendant after he has been acquitted by a federal court is not a
violation of the double jeopardy prohibition. Double jeopardy only
protects a defendant from successive prosecutions by the same
sovereign.8
As indicated, when there is more than one offense involved in the
act which the accused allegedly committed, the accused may be
prosecuted for each offense; i.e., without incurring the double jeopardy
prohibition. The offenses must be capable of standing alone with all
the necessary elements of each offense present. It is the individual
offenses that are being tried and not the "act."
Kentucky's definition of double jeopardy is built on the same con-
cept of separate offenses arising out of the same act that has been
used in many courts from early times. By being able to find two
separate offenses in the act committed by Runyon, the court was able
to apply this separate offense idea. This application permitted the
court to affirm the lower court's decision that the defendant was not
placed in double jeopardy by the second trial on the false claim
indictment.
0. Lawrence Mielke
CmimaNA LAw-SEARcH INCIDENT To ARET FOR TIRFc VioLronoN-
PLAwN Vmw DoCMWE-CONs=r.-The defendant was convicted of il-
legally transporting alcoholic beverages in local option territory. After
arresting the defendant for reckless driving, the officer discovered the
evidence necessary for the above conviction by looking through an
opening between the fender and trunk lid of defendant's automobile.
The arresting officer had to assume a crouched or bent-over position
before the evidence was visible. After this disclosure the defendant
consented to open the trunk. Held: Reversed. The mere fact of an
arrest for a traffic or other minor violation does not give the arresting
officer an absolute right to search the vehicle or premises indis-
criminately. There was no reasonable basis for the officer's searching
the trunk of the car in connection with the charge of reckless driving.
The evidence was not "clearly" or "plainly" visible and the search was
not accomplished with the voluntary consent of the appellant. Johns
v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. 1965).
In the past, several cases have upheld searches and seizures
8Bartkus v. llinois, 859 U.S. 121 (1959).
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